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1. Introduction 
Air services are often regarded as public goods in regions where they are not commercially viable 
resulting in public interest in providing or subsidising these services. As airlines around the globe find 
it increasingly difficult to generate sustainable profit margins (mainly because of the sharp increase in 
fuel costs), it is ever more important to remote regions, where passenger and cargo air transport is 
often essential for the social and economic development of the region, that such air services are 
supported by public funds. If governments, public transport or regional authorities procure such 
transport services (as opposed to producing them internally), a contractual relationship between a 
principal (transport authority) and agent (operator) exists. Depending on the set up, these schemes can 
differ substantially in their motivation, effectiveness and efficiency. In Europe the chosen approach is 
to procure public service obligation (PSO) air services, but even though Europe is renowned for its 
harmonisation aspirations, the interpretation and application of the PSO air service mechanism differs 
substantially across the European member states. Although this brings its own difficulties for the 
stakeholders involved, such heterogeneity is positive for the purposes of this paper which is to learn 
from best practices of procuring such services and to derive lessons for the Australian approach to 
publicly funding air services to remote regions.  
The remainder of the paper is structured in 4 sections. Section 2 provides some background on the 
Australian and European approach. Section 3 details the empirical application, the results are 
discussed in section 4 and some conclusions are presented in section 5.  
2. Setting the scene 
Despite the austerity measures in some countries (i.e. Ireland), public support of air services to remote 
regions is a growing phenomenon (see for example the recent proposals in Russia) and can be found 
in many countries around the globe; the most noteworthy being the United States (e.g. Matisziw et al., 
2012), Canada (e.g. Metrass-Mendes et al., 2011), India, Australia (e.g. Merkert and Hensher, 2011), 
Norway, Iceland and many member states of the European Union (e.g. Merkert and Williams, 2010). 
In this paper we are most interested in the European case as we aim to draw some lessons from 
Europe for other countries, such as the similarly federated structure of Australia. 
The Australian Remote Air Service Subsidy Scheme (RASS; as one of four pillars of support for air 
transport in Australian remote regions) is interesting, in that, similar to the European model, it 
provides selected airlines with a fixed-term (natural) monopoly on the specified routes. In addition 
these carriers receive direct subsidies from the Australian Government through their air service 
contracts. The RASS contracts govern scheduled weekly air transport services to 252 remote 
communities in Australia throughout Western Australia, Northern Territory, Queensland, South 
Australia and Tasmania. The RASS scheme covers 10 geographical regions in Australia and in 2012 a 
total of five operators were contracted by the Australian Government. As there are only five operators 
across the 10 regions, two of them operate RASS air services in more than one region. Although there 
is no competition in the market, there is in principle competition for the market; operators are selected 
through an open tender process in accordance with the Commonwealth Procurement Guidelines. The 
RASS contracts specify the provision of both passengers and cargo (such as fresh food, or other 
urgent supplies) to these regions, and although mail is also carried on these flights, the latter is 
governed under a separate contract with Australia Post. Although regions and airports can apply for 
RASS scheme recognition, the funding comes centrally from the Australian Government, which is a 
key difference with Europe. 
In Europe the chosen approach is to procure public service obligation (PSO) air services, but its 
interpretation and application differs substantially across the European member states. 
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Member States may impose PSOs on dedicated routes, if they feel that air services are vital for the 
economic and/or social development of the regions these routes serve and that without subsidies 
and/or regulatory measures to protect them no satisfactory scheduled air services to these regions 
would be maintained. Although the member states must respect the conditions and requirements set 
out in Article 16 of the Air Services Regulation 1008/2008, the interpretation of the “air service 
adequacy” depends on the judgement of the Public Transport Authority imposing the PSO. As a 
consequence and also because of geographical differences across the EU (e.g. Greece having many 
small islands and hence potentially many qualifying regions) there is substantial heterogeneity and 
imbalance of application between different regions across Europe (EU) in terms of the provision of 
PSO operations (e.g. Williams and Pagliari, 2004). For example, in Norway and the thin routes 
serving the Shetland Islands in Scottish PSO operators use rather small aircraft to provide the vital air 
services to the remoter communities in these regions. In contrast in France, many PSO routes are 
served by big aircraft such as A320 or even Boeing 777-300ER partly because these routes have high 
traffic in the summer months. Since these routes are often also competing with ground transport, 
previous research has extensively focused on whether some of these PSO routes are legitimate (e.g. 
Gordijn and van de Coevering, 2006; or more recently Bråthen and Halpern, 2012, highlight the 
social and economic benefits of PSOs in Europe) or rather a product of market protectionism (e.g. 
Merkert, 2011) and lobby group intervention.  
In terms of existing empirical literature, there appear to be two strands. One is interested in the 
cost/benefits of supporting such services. Cabrera et al. (2011), for instance, found that subsidies paid 
to Spanish PSO operators result in market distortions, and Calzada and Fageday (2009) revealed that 
Spanish PSO routes which benefit from price discounts given to island residents, exhibit higher prices 
but similar frequencies than the rest of the routes. The other strand is primarily concerned with the 
efficiency of the operators and ways that would help to make the transport contracts and eventually 
the operations of PSO air services more efficient. With that regard Merkert and Williams (2010) 
found in their cross-country study on the efficiency and practice of European PSO air operators 
revealed that operators that are in an early stage of their contracts are, according to their findings, 
more efficient than those that are close to the renewal/re-tendering phase of their contracts. This 
indicates that there are insufficient incentives to improve efficiency before retendering occurs. This 
phenomenon may be a result of the too little competition and almost non-existent cross-border 
competition for the PSO contracts during the mandatory tendering process. This can act as a salutary 
reminder for Australia (and other countries) as the Australian system does not have significant inter-
state competition for the market either. As the European PSO operators’ experiences pointed to 
contract attributes being part of the problem in terms of inefficiency, Merkert and Hensher (2011) 
analysed European and Australian public air service contracts. Their results suggest that Australian 
contracts are not only simpler and clearer, but also perceived by senior airline management to be more 
complete. In addition, there appears to be more trust between Australian carriers and their relevant 
public transport authorities compared to the European counterparts, which results in lower transaction 
costs for the Australian carriers. In sum, we find that the literature has recently been well developed 
along the lines of PSO operators’ efficiency analysis, ex post cost/benefit evaluations and contractual 
analysis as well as the operators’ perspective with regard to their contracts and their relationship to the 
transport authorities. What has been missing, however, is the authorities’ perspective and their 
motivations for procuring PSO air services. This paper aims to address this area, and makes use of the 
heterogeneity of the European system to highlight best practices by analysing the different 
views/approaches of the analysed European countries and their procurement agencies/authorities. 
3. Methodology and sample 
As the prime interest of this paper is to derive lessons from the views/perspectives of Europe’s PSO 
aviation transport authorities, we undertook a survey and contacted all of the authorities who get 
involved in PSO procurement in the relevant member states. In order to identify the routes, contracts 
and responsible authorities we first carried out a document review and analysed all tender information 
from the recent past that was publicly available. 
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We then contacted more than 30 transport authorities and as a result identified some 20 of them as 
PSO sponsoring authorities (the Icelandic Road Administration being responsible for PSO air service 
procurement in Iceland is a good example of the how diverse the responsible authorities across the 
member states are, which is an additional observation from this research). The next step was to 
identify and engage with the person within those sponsoring authorities, who is actually responsible 
for air PSO procurement/development. We took that step very seriously, as it is often a very specific 
person who undertakes this role and who is therefore in the position to respond to our questions 
accurately. Whilst initially we interpreted, that the public transport authorities were secretive (as one 
might expect given the perceived lack in transparency and level of subsidies involved), through the 
very time-consuming respondent recruiting process (and the even more time consuming post-survey 
follow up emails) we concluded that it was rather language barriers and the difficulty of 
identifying/tracking down the responsible PSO person in each of the PSO procuring countries, which 
made our task more difficult. Once we had overcome these two hurdles, the respondents were actually 
surprisingly eager to help and very interested to receive the promised summary of results, indicating 
an interest in what their colleagues elsewhere around the EU were doing. Only two authorities refused 
to complete the survey claiming it was policy not to respond to such external enquiries. In line with 
our pre-research undertakings we have made efforts to generalise the answers presented, and to 
remove any local references that might easily identify the specific author or department of a comment 
or practice. 
In terms of the survey content, we asked the respondents 30 (primarily closed) questions that we 
aimed at identifying current practice and views on future developments in the following five areas (for 
the detailed questions see Appendix A): 
• Output/Routes, Subsidies, Justification of programme 
• Procedural questions on their PSO programme 
• Common PSO contract specifications 
• Marketing efforts and route development aspirations 
• Operator selection criteria and competition 
The survey questions have been developed in collaboration and tested/piloted with various 
stakeholders of the European PSO aviation scene, including both transport authorities and senior 
regional airline management (in fact, one of the authors used to be commercial director of a European 
PSO airline). The survey was eventually carried out in early 2011. 
Regarding the sample it is noteworthy that ten EU Member States (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK) and two European Economic Area countries 
(Iceland and Norway) currently impose PSOs, with France and Norway accounting for around one 
half of these. We have surveyed authorities from all of these states and have received valid responses 
from 16 participating authorities, which when combined manage 91 PSO contracts, as shown in Table 
1. As detailed above, because of language barriers, difficulties tracking down the correct person (in 
cases where we could not get through to the person responsible for PSO air services we aimed for the 
head of the authority to reply) and restrictive authorities’ information sharing policies, we were unable 
to obtain responses from Spain, the Azores, Greece, Scottish central government and some of the 
more obscure French PSOs run by island or Chamber of Commerce entities. We feel, however, that 
our sample provides good diversity of type and geographic coverage of the continent allowing some 
significant patterns to emerge. 
Table 1 illustrates that some authorities are responsible for more than one PSO route. As we felt that 
we could not ask these authorities to complete a survey for each individual route (in the case of 
France that would be 21 surveys) but asked them to use their judgement and generalise on their 
practices. A key implication of the multi-route responses is that certain answers needed to be viewed 
by weighting based on the number of managed contracts, as the patterns do change, often 
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significantly, when this weighting exercise is undertaken. In much of our discussion we, thus, present 
both un-weighted and weighted summaries of the data. 
Table 1: Sample of participated authorities 
Procuring authority Country Routes 
Finnish Ministry of Transport and Communication Finland 1 
French CAA - Air Transport Directorate France 30 
Bavarian Ministry of Trade, Infrastructure, Transport 
and Technology Germany 1 
Thuringia Ministry for Construction and Transport Germany 1 
Icelandic Road Administration Iceland 7 
Galway County Council Ireland 1 
ENAC - Air Transport Development Division Italy 7 
Portuguese Civil Aviation Authority Portugal 1 
Argyll and Bute Council Scotland 1 
Irish Department of Transport - Airports Division Ireland 6 
Comhairle nan Eilean Siar (Western Isles Council) Scotland 2 
Orkney Islands Council Scotland 1 
Shetland Islands Council  Scotland 1 
Trafikverket Sweden 9 
Welsh Assembly Government  Wales 1 
Ministry of Transport and Communications 
Luftfartsseksjonen / Civil Aviation Section 
 
Norway 21 
Total (16) 11 91 
                   Note that some PSO contracts cover more than one route. 
4. Results 
Despite the heterogeneity across the analysed European countries (resulting from both geographical 
variety and difference in the interpretation of the PSO mechanism), we find interesting patterns in the 
perceptions of the transport authorities that have participated in our survey. In this section we discuss 
the responses of the transport authorities broken down into the five key areas of our survey.  
4.1 Output/routes, subsidies, justification of programme 
As PSO air services often involve not only regulatory but also financial public support and hence the 
internal justification of any PSO programme is a key question (value for money). For that reason, we 
started our questionnaire with that question and asked the authorities to rank different potential 
justifications for the PSO programme under their control. As shown in Table 2, although the results 
show that the main justification differs across the participating authorities, there is a trend towards 
three key justifications.  
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Table 2: Results regarding main justification for PSO programme 
Category Lifeline 
Services 
(ensuring 
modern 
life) 
Tourism 
to the 
remote 
region 
Regional 
Development 
Access to 
an onward 
domestic 
hub for the 
remote 
region 
Access to an 
onward 
international 
hub for the 
remote 
region 
Increasing the 
hinterland 
reach of the 
national / 
regional 
centre 
Other 
Mean 4.27 4.67 3.53 4.6 4.93 4.53 5.73 
# 1 priority 5  4   3  
Note: We employed a seven-level Likert scale (1=most important, 7=not relevant) 
 
The results shown in Table 2 suggest that public authorities see PSOs primarily as serving two 
separate needs. For really remote or isolated communities delivering lifeline services (most often 
selected as number one priority) which ensure modern life (access to health, social services, 
administration, education, visiting friends and relatives) is seen as critical in these communities. Other 
countries see the PSO programme primarily as a means to underpin economic and regional 
development (on average the best score and therefore on average most relevant to the authorities) in 
the selected communities. That “Increasing the hinterland reach of the national / regional centre“, was 
ranked as the third most important justification, is somewhat unexpected. However, upon reflection 
this can be interpreted in the way that some countries have very strong and centralised capital cities, 
and ensuring modern and civilised life requires, from their perspective, that their outlying citizens can 
get to these centres of administration, culture and sophistication. The other telling response is that for 
all options (including “providing lifeline services”) the authorities selected surprisingly often “Least 
relevant”. This also becomes apparent through the means of the responses being for all but one 
category higher than 4. This indicates that authorities usually justify their PSO programmes typically 
with one particular objective/aim and that sub-objectives or the combination of categories play only a 
very minor role in the justification process.  In retrospect we wonder whether these justifications, 
which can involve significant public spending, were based upon any objective studies or reviews, or 
whether they were the conclusions of common sense analysis by the officials, the inheritance of 
previous regional legacy practices, or the effective lobbying by representatives of the beneficiary 
regions.  
In terms of expectation for the future, we were expecting that most authorities would indicate a 
reduction of their spending on PSO air services (given the on-going austerity and recent example such 
as the substantial cut in PSO air service funding in Ireland). It was therefore surprising to see that 5 
authorities were actually planning to increase their spending on PSO air services above inflation, 3 
would increase it in line with inflation, 3 would leave it at current levels and only 5 would reduce it. If 
we weigh this by the number of contracts, it would still be 15 contracts for which spending would rise 
above inflation but for the majority of contracts (34) the authorities are expecting no change in public 
spending. This is an interesting finding illustrating the enduring importance of PSO air services in 
Europe. 
Slightly less positive is the authorities’ forecast when asked whether any of their routes are under 
threat of termination as six authorities answered this question with yes. Given that these were the 
authorities who control the large programmes (in total they manage 56 contracts), it is however hardly 
surprising that some of the routes in their portfolio, but not their programme as a whole, is under 
threat of termination. Overall, therefore the future looks buoyant from an authorities’ perspective 
regarding European PSO air services. A most revealing answer from the authorities was in reply to the 
question on whether they see any of their routes becoming ready to move to free market unsubsidised 
solutions. All authorities indicated that this would not be the case in the foreseeable future. Although 
the legislation holds out the hope that PSO status may be only temporary and that some routes will 
move to unsubsidised or unprotected status – in reality no sponsoring authority is currently expecting 
this. This also underlines the point that no authority feels their PSO routes status is borderline. Of 
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course the Irish case is one where PSOs have been cancelled, because of an austerity agenda and 
improved and acceptable alternative transport modes. Tellingly, none of the cancelled routes now 
support a free market scheduled air link with Dublin after cancellation. Regarding contract length it is 
expected that nothing will change, as along with EU legislation, the authorities plan to tender 
contracts that will be between three to four years (85% of routes; however, that two authorities opted 
for shorter periods and one for a longer period surprised us). 
4.2 Procedural questions on their PSO programme 
This section of the survey aimed to reveal insightful details regarding the authorities PSO procedures 
including the transparency around the awarding process, risk sharing with the operator and incentives 
for operators. As subsidies for PSO services have been the centre of much political debate, we were 
surprised that most of the authorities indicated that the subsidy awarded to the successful bidder 
would be actually available as shown in Table 3. What is usually not published are the bids of the 
unsuccessful bidder, although four (small) authorities indicated that all financial aspects of bids for 
PSO-routes are made public after the contracts have been awarded, which in their view ensures 
transparency in the tender process. 
Table 3: Summary of main positions to transparency of subsidy 
 No we don’t publish (but 
declare to EC), because of 
commercial confidentiality 
No we don’t publish, but it 
is available under freedom 
of information request 
Yes we publish because of the 
requirements of transparency 
with public funds 
Transport 
authorities  
5 4 7 
Routes  11 39 41 
 
Our results indicate further, that there is a split in responses on whether the subsidy as such is 
guaranteed (assuming satisfactory performance) or reduced dependent upon audited performance of 
the operator. It is interesting to see that the authorities’ interpret the rules differently with regard to 
what is actually being agreed at the time of contract signing. What we tried to tease out is whether the 
subsidy amount is the maximum that will be paid if the operator can demonstrate that they need it all, 
or whether the subsidy will be reduced if the operator performs better than their financial projections 
at the time of bid. Particularly when the responses are weighted the pattern suggests that the large 
PSO programmes tend to the maximum subsidy interpretation of the legislation. The level of subsidy 
is then fixed at commencement or linked to inflation over the contract period for most authorities. As 
the maximum length of a PSO contract has recently been extended (EU legislation) from three to four 
years, predicting costs of various aspects has become more difficult indicating an imbalance of risk 
with regard to costs that the operator may endure, and that the sponsoring authority will underwrite. 
Only a minority of tenders seem to accept a first year subsidy request, which then can be changed 
from year to year based upon inflation or other agreed criteria. Most authorities indicated strong 
interest in budget certainty at the outset of the PSO contract with a wish for no unexpected or 
unplanned subsidy changes. This position is reportedly very off putting for operators (confirmed by 
five operators) when there are no fuel price adjustors (and allowance for other cost variables outside 
of the air operator’s control) built into the PSO air contracts, as is common in PSOs for other modes 
of transport, and in nearly all other aviation contracts. 
4.3 Common PSO contract specifications 
Most sponsoring authorities (14/16) try to influence travel affordability by specifying a maximum 
fare. However, by weighting the replies we reverse the picture to some extent (39 routes without a 
cap), suggesting that in some of the larger PSO programmes (possibly more concerned about regional 
development than lifeline links) the affordability issue is less key. It would be interesting to examine 
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in more detail how the operators use (or misuse) this additional freedom in their pricing, on what 
essentially are monopoly routes.  
Table 4: Summary of what maximum fares include 
 Airport 
 taxes 
Passenger 
 taxes 
Luggage  
charges 
Credit 
card 
payment 
charges 
Date 
change 
flexibility 
Name 
changes 
Priority 
boarding 
In-flight 
refreshment 
Authorities 10 9 7 5 3 1 1 2 
Routes  36 30 34 36 3 1 1 8 
   Note: The option “Other” was not selected by any of the respondents 
Among those authorities who specify maximum fares, there is a strong view that these fares must 
include primarily airport and passenger taxes, but a significant proportion also includes other aspects 
as standard, as shown in table 4. As free market aviation continues to disaggregate/unbundle the fare 
there is therefore a tendency for established PSO routes to continue with practices that are becoming 
less commonplace around the industry. One potential unintended consequence of these requirements 
is the complexity this can inadvertently impose on a bidding airline which does not have the 
capability to easily cater for these additional impositions in their IT and booking systems.  
Table 5: Summary of type of fare concessions that the PSOs specify 
 Pensioners  Student 
and 
child 
Other 
social 
Discounted 
(advanced 
booking) 
Local 
residents 
None 
specified 
Other 
Authorities 5 6 1 2 6 7 1 
Routes  31 61 21 2 41 21 30 
 
Similarly, although not unexpected, the typical PSO contract also includes various requirements and 
types of fare concessions that are pre-specified by the authorities. Beneath the maximum fare price it 
is then left to the discretion of the operator to offer further discounted fares. That PSO contracts are 
pre-specified by the authorities to support particular socioeconomic aims is similar to general public 
transport policy. What is different in the aviation context is, however, for local residents at the remote 
end of the route to enjoy favoured treatment, particularly in the larger programmes (on not less than 
41 routes). 
Elaborating the complexity and IT/booking system requirements identified in Table 4 further, we find 
it interesting that most authorities require from the selected operator have an online booking system 
(10 authorities), that they have their flights displayed in a GDS (8 authorities, but 76 routes) and also 
that they have an interline arrangement with an operator at the connecting airport. We do understand 
that these specifications are aimed at providing onward connectivity beyond the hub destination and 
also in providing visibility for the destination on a world-wide basis. From another point of view, 
however we also see a danger in the requirements, that they represent a potential market entry barrier 
(as substantial investments, mainly of time, may be required to pre-negotiate such arrangements 
speculatively in advance of completing an air operator’s submission, for what are often very thin 
routes).  
Another aspect of contemporary debate, not only in relation to PSOs, but also in the low cost carrier 
context, is that of financial support (in the form of discounted airport charges) from regional airports 
to airlines. This is potentially an indirect (semi-visible) way of subsidising PSO air services and our 
results show that authorities are aware of such practices primarily at remote (4 authorities) and 
regional airports and less so at major airports (2 authorities). However, a detailed analysis shows that 
the extent of discounting increases in the larger programmes (33 routes to remote airports and 31 
routes to main airports are potentially supported by the airports). With more central government 
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planning and intervention the larger PSO programmes appear to ensure that airports play more of a 
role in helping facilitate the air services. Problematic for policy makers however is that as more major 
airports enter private ownership is it less likely that they will be financially indulgent in supporting 
their remote or PSO routes.  For instance Cardiff Airport offered discounted charges on the first round 
of the new Welsh PSO, whilst they dropped this discount in future rounds. 
Regarding aircraft and timetable pre-specification the view of the authorities varies slightly, but all of 
them try to essentially achieve the same goal; that of securing minimum service level requirements. In 
this context for operators, the two most important criteria are size of aircraft/capacity and airport 
infrastructure. The absolute minimum aircraft size we found specified was an eight seater, but for 
many authorities the minimum aircraft specified is a pressurised 30 seater. Airports infrastructure may 
dictate possibilities as some airports in remote regions have very short runways and inferior runway 
surfaces and can only accommodate particular aircraft, such as the BN Islander. For timetabling the 
obligations set by the authorities vary depending on the underlying objective of the PSO.  For instance 
not many authorities insist on a weekend operation, although a 7 day / week role in supporting 
tourism and VFR traffic is often recognised. All PSO contracts and authorities recognise that the 
minimum service aim that is to facilitate a day’s work for travellers at each end of the route wherever 
possible.  
In addition to passenger service obligations, we also explored the aspirations of economic 
development and the delivery of lifeline services and the apparent lack of interest or awareness of air 
cargo in the PSO specification. Only three authorities indicated that their PSOs would a carry 
significant air cargo and mail.  When taking the weighted results into account the results show even 
less interest in air cargo suggesting the big PSO programmes consider air cargo even less than the 
small PSO programmes. Only 10 routes specify cargo requirements in the PSO tender, which is 
surprising as initially our presumption was that authorities would be interested to improve economics 
to islands by say combining mail, newspaper, ad hoc freight and passenger services on the one flight. 
There is little evidence this is happening, although from personal experience we know some of the 
smaller Scottish Isles such as Barra take mail and newspapers on the PSO flight. On the larger routes 
we find no evidence of the freight integrators (DHL, FedEx etc.) or postal services establishing 
regular contracts with PSO services. 
4.4 Marketing efforts and route development aspirations 
Marketing a PSO route is in our view essential to develop the route in a business that benefits from 
tourism and other factors and thereby can become more commercially viable. Interestingly, nine of 
our 16 analysed transport authorities did not specifically require the operator to market the PSO route. 
This suggests that many sponsoring authorities presume that the operator will market the route 
anyway, but do not concern themselves with this aspect of fulfilment. Even more interesting is then 
that 15 out of the 16 authorities know that their operators spend less 5% of the public support for the 
route on sales and marketing, which suggests that overall not much focus is expended in terms of 
developing the route. This appears counterproductive as any success in building the patronage on the 
route has a direct impact on the subsidies required into the future. One point worth considering is that 
the sponsoring authority, rather than the air operator, is actually often better placed to invest in 
marketing. These days much tourism marketing is now destination marketing rather than route 
marketing, and an airline with a temporary presence on a route will find it difficult to take a long term 
view of the destination. At the very least partnership marketing should be encouraged between the air 
operator and the other stakeholders in the region. 
Another aspect worth considering in this matter is how do airline franchisee’s account for their 
marketing spend.  Small franchise partners of larger groups will in effect have much of their 
marketing done under the parent brand, and will pay their marketing contribution through their 
franchise fee. Yet another facet of this issue is how does an airline account for its marketing effort in 
its tender budget submission. If it enters a large amount for marketing it could lose the tender, because 
it requests too much subsidy. If it earmarks a small amount for marketing, it maximises its chance of 
success in the tender, but the marketing effort will therefore tend to be under-resourced by these 
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calculations.  None of these tendencies augurs well for the long term health of the route. One view is 
that the authority should recognise that it is in effect sponsoring the marketing and that it should more 
consciously take control of (or at least an interest in) this budget. This would additionally have the 
benefit of putting all respondents on a level playing field, and allow the exercise to be properly 
resourced for the long-term good of the route.  Under one scenario the authority could specify in the 
tender that the air operator should have a marketing budget of at least €XX, and the tender submission 
should specify how they will effectively spend it. 
In terms of route development and revenue growth it is also interesting to consider who receives the 
net benefit if revenues are above tender submission projections. One potentially perverse aspect of the 
way some PSO contracts are designed is that the operator receives no additional benefit from above 
target performance. Put another way the operator bears all the downside risks and none of the upside 
rewards. In other words the best margin the operator can enjoy is what is predicted in their bid. Again, 
no incentive to make this route a success story (over and above of the fulfilment of the tender 
submission revenue projections). The response of respondent authorities is somewhat encouraging for 
operators, as reportedly many authorities do find ways to inject incentive into the system either by 
sharing the upside, or by letting the operator completely retain the results of their above target 
performance, as shown in table 6.  
Table 6: Summary on who receives benefit once revenue is above tender projections 
 The 
operator  
The sponsoring authority 
via reduced subsidy 
Both 
parties 
Other 
Authorities 7 4 5 1 
Routes  42 10 39 1 
 
It is noteworthy that some of the authorities who aim to benefit by having to pay less subsidies and 
enjoy all the upside rewards, explained that their hands are tied by the legislation. In these cases the 
authorities indicated that they are aware of this weakness in their contracts; leaving operators with no 
incentive to grow the route; and yet portrayed themselves as powerless in the face of their legal 
advisors. 
4.5 Operator selection criteria and competition 
Regarding the selection of operators we find it interesting that pre-screening processes before full 
tender and formal operator audits after selection but before the formal award are rarely used by our 
analysed transport authorities (both only applied by three authorities). The two aspects checked within 
the submission tender documents are the operating licences and some light financial fitness criteria (in 
line with EU legislation). What appears to be much more common is to use specialist aviation or other 
consultants in the selection process (8 authorities did so for their in total 76 routes). The larger PSO 
authorities one might think would have more internal expertise to manage the process without 
specialist help.  Nevertheless our weighted results suggest that the larger authorities actually rely on 
specialist help more than the smaller. It would be interesting to find out if those authorities, who had 
used consultants, were satisfied with their advice and the hand holding they received. 
With respect to the level of competition for the PSO routes, 13 authorities (controlling 83 out of 91 
contracts) indicate that there is not sufficient competition. When asked what the authorities would do 
to increase the number of bidders for their PSOs, the majority of authorities indicated that they see the 
EU Journal as their marketing effort. We find this unconvincing and argue that, if as has been 
acknowledged subsidies will be reduced where there is real and keen competition, then it should be 
very much in the sponsoring authority’s interests to do all they can to increase competition. From 
operators we know that if the first time they hear about an opportunity is when reading about it in the 
EU Journal then it is invariably far too late to bid. With only four weeks typically to respond there is 
not enough time for research, source local suppliers and develop a winning strategy. Nevertheless, it 
is likely much of the ‘competition’ in effect happens informally. Often there is an obvious lead 
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contender and maybe one other aspirant who will try their luck.  However many other operators will 
have given the opportunity a cursory look before deciding against bidding. Although this suggests that 
there is more competition than the formal final line up, it is still worth stressing that the authorities 
could do more to improve the competition for, and hence the efficiency of, their routes (in line with 
Merkert and Williams, 2010). The EU could help the process by creating a more user friendly 
database of current, and more pertinently, future tenders listing current operators, current aircraft 
types, route passenger numbers, dates due for re-tender and re-award, and the sponsoring transport 
authority and their contact details. Currently much cross boundary research is required by operators to 
find this sort of information that could be readily centrally compiled. Additionally transport 
authorities should be prepared to host meetings with potential future bidders between tender rounds.  
Alternatively open days are another way to improve communications between transport authorities 
and prospective operators. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper set out to learn from the European transport authorities perspectives and to derive some 
recommendations for the various stakeholders. Some general observations can be made that have 
emerged despite the heterogeneity of the European PSO approaches and that are therefore useful to 
any PSO context, including Australia. Based on the analysis undertaken, we believe that it is most 
important to make the entire PSO venture most attractive to operators (incentives to grow patronage, 
more equitable risk sharing, removing unnecessary or outdated complications and specifications etc.). 
This should result in higher levels of competition, which is to be encouraged, particularly at the cross 
border level. The performance of the PSO contracts should be monitored with a view to route 
improvement and hence eventually less public intervention and support. The authority’s 
understandable wish for budget certainty is perversely likely to have several unintended effects. The 
tender competition is likely to be reduced because of the higher risks involved. Counter intuitively 
asymmetry of risk results in increased subsidy because the operator will err very much on the side of 
price safety with regard to assumptions on fuel costs, airport charges, currency fluctuations (with the 
US dollar being so important in aviation) airport rentals and suchlike. 
In our view, it is important that the authorities should change their perception and see that the route 
does not ‘belong’ to the operator but ‘belongs’ to the authority. This in effect would have substantial 
positive impacts on long term branding, ownership and strategy and would result in the authority 
retaining marketing responsibility, specifying marketing budget or fostering partnership marketing 
(e.g. subcontracting to economic/tourism development agencies or taking a keener interest in the 
winning air operator’s marketing strategy, and making this a declared part of the section criteria). The 
authorities should also become more pro-active (i.e. in bringing down real and perceived entry 
barriers) in between tenders, as once a tender is published it is too late for talking & 
preparing/strategy and attracting new entrants. In order to increase competition there should be 
maximum transparency (in areas such as current subsidy levels, and details of the previous tender 
bids) in order to facilitate competition/level playing field and the authorities should signal openness to 
new aspirant operators (not just the incumbent, who know doubt they have come to know every well). 
An approach that has worked for railways is that authorities could own assets/aircraft and lease them 
to the operator, which would bring down market entry barriers. If that is not feasible, then the 
authorities could opt for longer PSO contracts to allow operators to achieve a sufficient return on 
investment. Authorities should in any case accept that they must share future price uncertainties with 
operators in order to improve both, competition for contracts and operators’ efficiency. In our view, 
transport authorities should get the benefits of any growth on the route when retendering and allow 
operators to enjoy some profits/incentives for making revenue progress in the shorter term during the 
PSO contract period. A consistent and more transparent framework, with an active centralised 
information gathering/providing European secretariat is currently missing. A better exchange of PSO 
success and best practice across the continent could also ensure all authorities improve their game. 
Indeed we contend that global comparisons could be instructive and are keen to foster such further 
studies.  
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It seems to us that operators should challenge the standard local contract as local interpretations are 
not consistent across the EC. They should in particular seek fuel price adjustors and other cost / risk 
sharing measures (e.g. future airport tax and rental increases) as well as realistic ways to grow the 
route with the authority’s cooperation. 
Local airports should be mindful of their regional economic development role and not just balancing 
of the airport’s books within their perimeter fence. Major airports should consider slot access of their 
regions/domestic market (self-regulation might be wise to avoid the possibility of eventual legislative 
intervention). In addition it is important to align the airports and transport authorities objectives, 
which in theory should be straightforward as many of the airports are in public ownership, but is 
much less so in practice.  
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Appendix A 
The following set of questions shows the template that we used in our survey: 
Output/Routes, Subsidies, Justification of programme 
1. Which PSO routes is your department responsible for? 
2. Prioritise, in order of importance, the main justifications for the PSO programme under your 
control (use numbers 1,2,3 etc)  
3. Is your spend on the PSO programme set to rise or fall in the coming years?  
4. Are any of your PSO routes under threat of termination? 
5. Are any of your PSO routes ready to move to free market unsubsidised solutions? 
6. How long is your next batch of PSO awards going to be for?  
Procedural questions on the authority’s PSO programme 
7. Do you publish the subsidy awarded to the successful bidder? Please explain your rationale in 
the box provided.  
8. Do you publish the subsidy bids of the unsuccessful bidders? Please explain your rationale in 
the box provided 
9. How flexible is the subsidy amount agreed in the tender? 
10. How does the subsidy change from year to year? 
Common PSO contract specifications 
11. Does your PSO specify a maximum fare? 
12. Please tick what the maximum fare includes (various add-ons)  
13. What type of fare concessions does the PSO specify? Please tick all relevant 
14. Do you require your selected operator to have (various online features)  
15. Do airports offer discounted charges to PSO services?  
16. If you specify a minimum sized aircraft, what is your rationale? Please express in terms of 
comfort, capacity, passenger acceptance or other criteria 
17. What timetabling requirements do you specify (e.g., early in the morning and evening for 
commuters) 
18. If you specify a weekend timetable what is your rationale? (leisure, tourism, friends and 
family etc ) 
19. Does your PSO route carry significant air cargo and mail?  
20. Do you require the operator to have any minimum cargo capacity? 
Marketing efforts and route development aspirations 
21. Do you require selected operators to market the PSO routes? 
22. Typically what percentage of the subsidy do operators declare spending on sales and 
marketing? 
23. If revenue is above tender projections, who receives the benefit? 
24. Put another way what incentive does the operator have to exceed their tender income 
projections? 
Operator selection criteria 
25. Do you have a pre-screening process before full tender?  
26. If you have financial fitness criteria please summarise the main areas of concern or interest 
27. Do you formally audit operators before award?  
28. Do you use specialist aviation or other consultants to advise you in your selection? 
29. Do you have sufficient competition for your PSO routes?  
30. Could you summarise any efforts to increase the number of bidders for your PSOs 
